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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This brief is submitted both in support of the appeal 
filed by Inteltech and Norton as their reply brief pursuant to 
Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and in response 
to the cross appeal that has been filed by plaintiff herein and 
is submitted pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The argument portion of the brief is 
divided into Section A which relates to the Inteltech appeal and 
to Section B which relates to the plaintiff's appeal. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. as an appeal from a final order 
and judgment of a District Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant accepts plaintiff's Statement of Issues. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is an appeal from an Order granting Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) in favor of plaintiff. The 
standard of review is found in the cases of King v. Fereday , 739 
P.2d 618 (Utah 1987) and Gustaveson v. Gregg. 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 
1982). On appeal, all evidence and reasonable inferences from 
evidence supporting the defendant must be accepted as true and 
all conflicts in evidence which tend to disprove the defendant's 
case must be disregarded. The trial court's granting of JNOV may 
only be affirmed if there is a total absence of competent 
evidence supporting the verdict. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Defendant accepts plaintiff's statement of 
determinitive authority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This action arises from a worker's compensation claim 
filed by plaintiff's husband, James Turner. The claim was 
adjusted by General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (GAB). GAB became 
suspicious of the validity of the claim and employed Inteldex 
Corporation (Inteltech) to investigate. 
An undercover investigation was conducted. Inteltech 
investigators appeared at Mr. Turner's worker's compensation 
hearing and testified regarding what they had learned. Both Mr. 
and Mrs. Turner affirmed that the testimony given by the 
Inteltech investigators at that hearing was true. 
The administrative law judge ruled against Mr. Turner 
at the worker's compensation hearing. Mr. and Mrs. Turner then 
sued GAB, Inteltech, and certain Inteltech employees. 
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B. Course of Proceedings, 
Defendant accepts plaintiff's statement of the course 
of proceedings, 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Inteltech incorporates its factual statement filed with 
its initial brief herein, and notes for the Court that plaintiff 
has not disputed any of the factual citations included therein. 
Inteltech disputes several of the statements of "fact" 
included in plaintiff's responsive brief. They are as follows: 
(1) At paragraph 19 of her "Factual Statement" 
contained in her brief, plaintiff claims that she missed work and 
that she paid $20 to a babysitter as a consequence of the 
investigation. Inteltech does not dispute that plaintiff 
testified to unspecified income loss and to a $20 expense. 
However, these were not established as facts at trial. The jury 
did not believe plaintiff's testimony. Even Judge Wilkinson who 
granted the JNOV in this case, did not find that any loss of 
income had been established. His award for out of pocket loss 
was $20. As pointed out in Inteltech's initial brief, there is 
substantial question about the credibility of plaintiff's 
testimony which justified the jury's determination that any 
expense was either not incurred, or could easily have been 
avoided by plaintiff. 
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(2) At paragraph 20 of plaintiff's statement of 
"facts", she claims that she suffered emotional and mental pain 
because of the Inteltech investigation. This fact is also 
disputed and was not found to exist by the jury. Plaintiff's 
testimony in this regard was contradicted by her own husband as 
well as by her psychiatric records. (Tr. 197-198, Tr. 385-389, 
Tr. 380-381.) Plaintiff's argument in her brief that her husband 
didn't know her true feelings is again based upon her testimony 
which the jury did not believe. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
(Section A. Support of Inteltech Appeal) 
POINT A-l 
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
CONSEQUENTLY, NO JNOV MAY BE GRANTED. 
The Jury in this case unanimously held that plaintiff 
had failed to prove any claim for invasion of privacy or for 
fraud. There was competent evidence to support this 
determination. The trial judge is precluded from substituting 
his own feelings from those of the jury with regard to issues of 
fact. Unfortunately in this case that is what Judge Wilkinson 
did. 
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A, Invasion of Privacy Claim. 
An invasion of privacy requires an intrusion into the 
private concerns of plaintiffs which was substantial and would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person. These are issues of 
fact which are uniquely within the province of the jury in 
judging what constitutes "substantial" and what constitutes 
"highly offensive." The jury in this case found against 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has attempted in her responsive brief to 
claim that the circumstances justify a determination as a matter 
of law that the action was substantial and highly offensive. 
There simply is no case support for that proposition. The cases 
cited by plaintiff make clear that these issues are reserved for 
jury determination and that a court is not to substitute its own 
judgment for that of the jury. 
B. A Jury's Verdict of No Cause of Action Fraud Was Well 
Supported. 
Plaintiff's primary failure of proof regarding her 
fraud claim was her lack of any pecuniary damage. While it is 
true that plaintiff herself testified to an unspecified loss of 
income and to an approximate $20 expense for a babysitter, the 
jury simply did not believe her. There were numerous 
contradictions in plaintiff's testimony and the testimony of 
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other witnesses. Additionally, evidence from plaintiff's 
psychiatric records demonstrated her inability to testify 
accurately with regard to these issues. Finally, plaintiff 
offered no explanation as to why she did not cancel the 
babysitter and thus save the expense after the Inteltech shopping 
spree had been similarly cancelled. 
Plaintiff's evidence was scanty at best and certainly 
did not meet a clear and convincing standard or even the 
preponderance of evidence standard. 
In addition, a review of the facts of this case shows 
that it is not a fraud case. Fraud involves a transaction 
between parties akin to contract. In this case, the only 
transaction involved was the promise of free products in exchange 
for plaintiff's willingness to use the products and meet with the 
investigator. Plaintiff received everything that she was 
promised. The substance of plaintiff's true claim was invasion 
of privacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress. This 
case does not fit any fraud analysis. 
POINT A-2 
THE JURY'S VERDICT DENYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Any punitive damage award requires a finding that the 
defendant violated plaintiff's rights either recklessly or 
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intentionally. In this case, the undisputed evidence showed no 
such conduct. Inteltech was diligent in obtainin legal advice in 
Utah and other states regarding the legality of its methods. It 
received opinions from all attorneys involved to the effect that 
its methods did not infringe on anyone's rights. If Inteltech 
violated any right, there is nothing to suggest that such a 
violation was a knowing or reckless act. To the contrary, quite 
the opposite was proved. 
POINT B-l 
THE JURY WAS CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THAT FRAUD CLAIMS 
IN THIS STATE ARE RESTRICTED TO ECONOMIC LOSS. 
It is the general rule in the United States that a 
claim of fraud must be a claim for economic or pecuniary loss and 
not for emotional distress. The only Utah cases of record 
regarding fraud deal with pecuniary loss. Fraud is not a 
"personal injury tort." 
Plaintiff has filed a lengthy string citation 
attempting to support the claim that a fraud claim may be made 
for strictly emotional distress damages. A review of those cases 
indicates that most are based either on special statutes, or 
special circumstances. Those cases that do deal with emotional 
distress damages under fraud appear to be blurring the 
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distinction between a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and fraud. 
This court has previously expressed its concern with 
emotional damage claims. Claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress are limited to the most egregious 
circumstances as accords with the Restatement of Torts (Second), 
Section 46. Plaintiff's attempt to evade this restriction by 
calling this action a fraud claim should not be countenanced. 
Her claim failed to meet the standards for an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and was 
dismissed at the trial level. This court should not expand fraud 
claims to include generalized emotional distress actions. Even 
if it were to accept the invitation to expand fraud claims to 
include emotional distress claims, it should apply the same rules 
as are applied in intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims and thus dismiss plaintiff's fraud claim herein. 
POINT B-2 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OP PLAINTIFF'S 
PSYCHOLCOGICAL PROBLEMS AND TREATMENT WAS COMPELLED 
BY THE LAW AND WAS NECESSARY TO A PROPER EVALUATION 
OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff had a lengthy history 
of psychological problems and trauma dating from her days as a 
child. She had been routinely abused by men in her family. 
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Plaintiff attempted in this case to make a claim for emotional 
distress damages but hold all evidence of her other psychological 
problems away from the jury. 
Those problems were particularly relevant in this case 
to demonstrate the true cause of her emotional problems; how the 
Inteltech investigation would have affected her, if at all; how 
her psychological problems affect her ability to recall regarding 
the Inteltech investigation; and the fact that even though she 
was receiving psychological counseling at the time, the Inteltech 
investigation was of such a de minimus effect in her life that 
she never mentioned it to any psychological counselor. 
Once plaintiff makes a claim for emotional distress 
damages and puts her credibility at issue before the jury, all 
information relevant to her credibility and emotional state 
becomes relevant. 
Plaintiff's suggestion that this issue was somehow 
abused by defendants is ridiculous. The only prejudice naturally 
flowing from the admission of this evidence was prejudice in 
plaintiff's favor. 
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POINT B-3 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DID NOT RECONVENE THE JURY 
FOR CONSIDERATION OF DAMAGE AMOUNTS. 
Plaintiff would like to pick and choose those aspects 
of the Judge7s JNOV which will be upheld. She would like to 
retain Judge Wilkinson's liability finding but return for a shot 
at greater damages to a jury. When requesting this unusual 
relief from the court, plaintiff's attorney was unable to cite 
any reason to support it. Utah case law makes clear that in a 
personal injury case, such an order is not appropriate. The 
issues regarding plaintiff's injuries and liability in this case 
are so intertwined that it is inappropriate to attempt to 
separate them by partial order. 
ARGUMENT 
(Section A) 
POINT A-l 
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
CONSEQUENTLY, NO JNOV MAY BE GRANTED. 
Plaintiff's brief has not disputed the clear case law 
cited by appellants regarding the standards for the granting of a 
JNOV. As pointed out in defendant's initial brief, a JNOV may 
only be granted if there is a total absence of competent evidence 
supporting the verdict. (King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1987)). A court is not entitled to substitute its own personal 
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feelings regarding the evidence and the believability of the 
witnesses for the jury's assessment and weighing of the evidence. 
(Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 
1979) . 
Unfortunately, in granting the JNOV in this case, that 
is exactly what Judge Wilkinson did. In his decision, Judge 
Wilkinson stated: 
. . . It was highly offensive to this court 
for the defendants to do what they did to 
Jackie Turner. 
(Court's Ruling, p. 20.) (Emphasis added.) 
The simple fact is that the jury disagreed unanimously. It found 
Inteltech's conduct to be appropriate. 
A. The Jury's Verdict of No Cause of Action on Plaintiff's 
Invasion of Privacy Claim was Well Supported. 
Plaintiff took no exception to the instruction to the 
jury regarding the standard for an invasion of privacy case. 
(Tr. 663.) That instruction was based upon the Restatement of 
Torts (Second), Section 652(b) and Comment D to that section. In 
essence, the instruction provided a two-prong test for an 
invasion of privacy claim: (1) did the defendant intrude on the 
solitude or seclusion of plaintiff or her private concerns? and 
(2) was there a substantial intrusion that would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person? 
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The jury quite clearly determined that the Inteltech 
investigation was not a substantial intrusion which was highly 
offensive. 
The visits involved in the Inteltech investigation were 
of very brief duration. They involved coming to the front step 
of the home, speaking on the telephone, or speaking in the front 
room or kitchen of the home after being invited in. The visits 
were not calculated to harass in any manner. The total time 
involved was 2 hours and 8 minutes spread over 5 casual visits. 
The jury determined that this was not a substantial intrusion. 
The jury further found that this was not "highly offensive" to 
them as reasonable persons. 
The issues of reasonableness, degree of intrusion, and 
offensiveness are clearly issues of fact within the special 
province of the jury. (Wyclais v. Guardian Title of Utah. 780 
P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989)). The jury's finding in this case 
cannot be ignored. 
In her responsive brief, plaintiff has cited several 
cases from other jurisdictions regarding invasion of privacy. A 
review of those cases, however, shows that to the extent that 
they relate to this action, they support Inteltech's position. 
They support the rule that the determination of what is 
"outrageous" or "highly offensive" conduct is a jury question and 
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not an issue to be taken away from the jury by the court. 
Furthermore, each of the cases involves substantially different 
facts from those in the instant case. Contrary to plaintiffs 
argument, these cases do not support a determination in this case 
that Inteltech's conduct was "highly offensive" as a matter of 
law. 
The case of Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1987) 
involved an invasion into plaintiff's home with television 
cameras. The plaintiff's husband was dying of a heart attack and 
paramedics had been called. An NBC camera crew, without 
receiving permission of any kind, barged into the home and 
entered plaintiff's bedroom where her dying husband lay. Graphic 
scenes were taken of his distress. He ultimately died. NBC 
thereafter broadcast this footage on several occasions on nightly 
news. The California Appellate Court reversed a summary judgment 
of dismissal. It determined that the conduct of barging into a 
bedroom and broadcasting a dying man's suffering on television 
could be considered by a jury to be "highly offensive to a 
reasonable person." It reversed the summary judgment so a jury 
could decide. 
It is important to note that the court in the Miller 
case did not determine as a matter of law that the right to 
privacy had been violated. It simply determined that there was a 
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jury issue. The invasion in that case was clearly far more 
severe than the invasion in this case. Scenes of the stricken 
man in his bedroom were broadcast nationally. Nevertheless, even 
in that circumstance, the court did not grant judgment as a 
matter of law as is requested here. The court turned to the 
wisdom of the jury. 
The case of Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Missouri 
App. 1987) involves the same result. In the Hester case, 
plaintiffs allege they had consulted about private family matters 
with their minister. They had understood that their 
communications with the minister were privileged. They alleged 
that their privacy had been violated because the minister 
publicly defamed their family and branded them as child abusers. 
The Missouri Appellate Court reversed a judgment on the pleadings 
which had dismissed the complaint. By doing so, it required 
trial by jury of the privacy claim. There is nothing in the case 
which suggests that the court was determining as a matter of law 
that judgment must be entered on the privacy claim. The court 
simply was referring that issue for jury determination. As with 
the NBC case, the Hester case involves conduct dramatically more 
egregious than that in the instant case. Nevertheless, the court 
required a jury to determine whether the conduct violated the 
right to privacy, it did not substitute its own opinion. 
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The other two cases on which plaintiff relies are the 
Victorian case of Demay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), and 
State v. Hyem, 630 P.2d 202 (Mont. 1981). The Demay case 
involved an unmarried man obtaining access to a married woman's 
bedroom and observing her during childbirth on the understanding 
that he was a doctor when, in fact, he was not. It did not 
involve a reversal of a jury decision. It involves an intrusion 
far in excess of that presented in the instant case. 
The Hyem case is a criminal search and seizure case. 
The decision clearly states it is based upon a special provision 
of the Montana Constitution as well as criminal search and 
seizure law. It simply does not apply. 
A review of plaintiff's cases reaffirms the proposition 
that the question of whether the conduct involved reaches the 
level of a "substantial and outrageous" intrusion must be left to 
the jury. In this case, the jury decided and found adversely to 
plaintiff. Judge Wilkinson's substitution of his personal views 
for the judgment of the jury is inappropriate and must be 
reversed. 
Additionally, the first prong of the standard for 
invasion of privacy: intrusion into private affairs, is not 
present in this case. While it is true that Inteltech personnel 
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conversed with plaintiff, there is no allegation that the matters 
discussed were in any way of a private nature. Plaintiff was 
willing to freely discuss them with a stranger, whom she believed 
was a salesman. Inteltech was simply attempting to obtain 
information regarding the employment of plaintiff's husband. 
Plaintiff's husband having made a worker's compensation claim had 
impliedly consented to a fair and reasonable investigation of 
that claim. Ellenbera v. Pinckerton's, 188 S.E.2d 911 (Geo. App. 
1972) . The jury determined that the investigation made in this 
case was reasonable. 
B. The Jury's Verdict of No Cause of Action for 
Fraud is Well Supported by the Evidence. 
Plaintiff's brief is correct in pointing out that the 
most obvious deficiency in her claim of fraud is her failure to 
prove any out of pocket damages. As noted in the Factual 
Statement, Judge Wilkinson and the jury agreed that plaintiff had 
not established any lost wages. Although plaintiff spent 
approximately two hours in contact with Inteltech, there was no 
evidence whatsoever that she would have spent any of that time 
gainfully employed. The evidence showed that she was at home at 
the time tending children or even sleeping. She certainly wasn't 
missing any work. 
16 
Judge Wilkinson, however, apparently concluded that 
plaintiff was believable in her testimony that she paid $20 to a 
babysitter. The jury disagreed. The jury rejected the fraud 
claim. 
As pointed out in Inteltech's initial brief, there was 
ample reason to question plaintiff's credibility. This included 
her psychological difficulties, her failure to report any of the 
traumatic occurrences she claimed to her psychotherapists, her 
willingness to lie to worker's compensation adjusters regarding 
her husband's employment, the conflicts between her testimony and 
the testimony of the Inteltech personnel, and the conflicts 
between her testimony and her husband's testimony. 
Furthermore, even if plaintiff had arranged to pay a 
babysitter approximately $20 to watch her children during a 
meeting with Inteltech, there was no evidence offered as to why 
she could not have simply canceled the babysitter after the 
meeting was canceled. There can be no claim for fraud if the 
damages caused could have been avoided. Conder v. Williams & 
Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987). 
Plaintiff's evidence of pecuniary loss resulting from 
Inteltech's action was scanty at best. It did not meet the 
"clear and convincing" standard or even a preponderance standard. 
The jury found plaintiff to be not credible and did not believe 
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that damage had been proved. A question of credibility of a 
witness is a question for the jury and not one to be taken away 
from the jury by a trial judge. 
In addition, the jury's verdict is supported by a 
failure on plaintiff's part to demonstrate other factors 
necessary to establish a fraud claim in addition to the lack of 
pecuniary damage. Plaintiff has presented no case law regarding 
a fraud case that even remotely resembles that presented here. 
The fact is that Inteltech's representations that they would 
provide free products were all true. Plaintiff agreed to speak 
with Inteltech people and received the products as promised. 
Mrs. Turner received everything that was promised by Inteltech. 
The compensation, which she was willing to accept, were the free 
products that she received. 
All of the various fraud cases which plaintiff has 
cited in her brief involve a fraud committed in a situation in 
which the plaintiff was fraudulently led to enter into a 
transaction of some kind (marriage, adoption, real estate, etc.) 
in which he received less consideration than he had been told 
would be received. This action, however, is totally different, 
Inteltech never promised plaintiff anything that they did not 
deliver. The inducement to converse with Inteltech was the 
promise of free products. The products were delivered. 
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Plaintiff received exactly what she was led to believe she would 
receive. 
This case simply does not fit into a fraud analysis. 
It is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
not a claim for a misrepresentation leading one into an unfair 
transaction. 
The fraud claim in this case should have been dismissed 
prior to trial. Even so, the jury did not believe the plaintiff. 
The fact that Judge Wilkinson found her believable does not 
justify ignoring the wisdom of the eight members of the jury. 
POINT A-2 
THE JURY'S VERDICT DENYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES WAS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The evidence presented by Inteltech was undisputed in 
showing that all inquiries it had made with legal counsel 
indicated that its method of investigation was lawful and 
appropriate. Inteltech received direction from a Utah attorney 
in this particular investigation. (Tr. 236-237.) Previously, 
Inteltech had sought and received legal approval from another 
local Utah attorney indicating the technique was lawful. (Tr. 
112-118.) Inteltech had been retained by agencies of the State 
of Utah, including law enforcement agencies, all of which 
confirmed that its technique was lawful. (Tr. 101, 115, 119.) 
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In her responsive brief, plaintiff does not deny the 
fact that these legal opinions were received by Inteltech. 
Inteltech never received any legal opinion to indicate that its 
technique was not lawful. Notwithstanding this evidence, 
plaintiff's brief claims that Inteltech's action was in knowing 
disregard of Jackie Turner's rights. Such a position makes no 
logical sense and has no support. Inteltech did the right thing, 
Inteltech inquired of attorneys and received their opinions 
before engaging in business in Utah. Inteltech had every reason 
to believe that its technique was lawful. If Inteltech violated 
any right (which the jury said it did not), there is nothing to 
suggest that such a violation was knowing or reckless. The 
opposite was proved. 
POINT B-l 
THE JURY WAS CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THAT FRAUD CLAIMS IN THIS STATE 
ARE RESTRICTED TO ECONOMIC LOSS. 
Plaintiff apparently concedes in her brief that there 
are no Utah cases permitting recovery from mental anguish for a 
claim based on fraud. Utah case law has stated consistently that 
the measure of damages in a fraud case is "the benefit of the 
bargain rule." That is the difference between the value of what 
was promised and the value of what was received. Duaan v. Jones 
, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
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This rule is consistent with the longstanding majority 
of decisions and the basic theory of fraud itself. Fraud is not 
a "personal injury" tort. It is a cause of action involving 
economic deception. The losses involved are the economic losses 
resulting from that deception. The general rule is as follows: 
But even if a broad range of damages is to be 
permitted in cases of intentional fraud, it 
must be remembered that deceit is an 
economic, not a dignitary tort, and resembles 
in the interest it seeks to protect, a 
contract claim more than a tort claim. For 
this reason, though strong men may cry at the 
loss of money, separate recovery for mental 
anguish is usually denied in deceit cases, 
just as it is denied in contract cases, 
simply because emotional distress, though 
resulting naturally from many frauds, is not 
one of the interests the law ordinarily seeks 
to protect in deceit cases. 
Dobbs, Remedies, Fraud & Deceit, Section 9.2 (1973). (Emphasis 
added.) 
This rule of damages for fraud is further supported by 
the Restatement of Torts (Second), Section 549. This section 
defines the damages available for fraudulent misrepresentations 
as follows: 
Measure of Damages for Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation. (1) The recipient of a 
fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to 
recover as damages in an action of deceit 
against the maker the pecuniary loss due him 
of which the misrepresentation is legal 
cause, including (a) the difference between 
the value of what he has received in the 
transaction and its purchase price or other 
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value given for it; and (b) the pecuniary 
loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of 
the recipient's reliance upon the 
misrepresentation. (2) The recipient of a 
fraudulent misrepresentation in a business 
transaction is also entitled to recover 
additional damages sufficient to the give him 
the benefit of his contract with the maker, 
if these damages are proved with reasonable 
certainty. (Emphasis added.) 
This basic rule is supported by cases from neighboring 
jurisdictions. See. Umphrey v. Sprinkel. 682 P.2d 1247 (Idaho 
1983); Ellis. Jr. v. Crockett. 451 P.2d 814 (Hawaii 1969) and 
cases cited therein. Cases outside the Pacific Reporter 
jurisdiction have similarly denied recovery of emotional and 
mental anguish damages in fraud claims. See. Walse v. Ingersoll-
Rand Company. 656 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1981) and cases cited 
therein. ("The general rule is that fraud is an economic tort 
and, thus, protects only pecuniary losses.") 656 F.2d 370. 
The rule of law cited is consistent with plaintiff's 
lead case from her brief, Dizick v. Umpqua Community College. 599 
P.2d 444 (Ore. 1979). The Dizick case involved a claim of a 
student in a community college to the effect that he had been 
deceived with regard to the specific training he would receive 
upon signing up for courses. The court found that he had, in 
fact, been deceived. The damages awarded were pecuniary damages. 
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He received damages compensating for lost income that resulted 
from his attendance at the school based upon the deceit. 
Plaintiffs brief further attempts to rely upon Prosser 
& Keeton, The Law of Torts, Chapter 18. Plaintiff includes a 
quote from the Prosser text in her brief. The quote, however, is 
a combination of phrases which are separated by approximately two 
pages of text in the original. A full and fair reading of 
Prosser's section gives no indication that Prosser is rejecting 
the general rule regarding fraud damages. The consequential 
damages referred to are further economic consequential damages. 
Prosser gives several examples at page 767 such as the loss of 
goods in a fire and the loss of investment in a business. 
Prosser does recognize the Vermont case of Vezina v. Soliere, 152 
A 798 which was a claim for personal injuries caused by a horse 
that was fraudulently represented to be gentle. 
Plaintiff has provided a lengthy string cite of cases 
from various jurisdictions in her brief claiming that each of the 
cases stands for the proposition that emotional damages may be 
recovered in a fraud claim. Most of the cases simply do not 
support that proposition. Several of the cases such as those 
from California and New Hampshire rely on particular civil code 
sections or other rules of law unique to those states. Rosener 
v. Sears, 168 Cal.Rptr. 237 (1980); Spraaue v. Sanders, 174 
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Cal.Rptr. 608 (1981); Crowley v. Global Realty, 474 A.2d 1056 
(N.H. 1984).Several involve considerations of punitive damage or 
physical damage (Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 N.Y.2d 139 (1926); 
Ridout-Brown Service, Inc. v. Hollaway, 397 S.2d 125) and several 
deal with fraud in inducement of marriage or adoption. Burr v. 
Board of County Commissioners of Stark County, 491 N.E.2d 1101 
(Ohio 1986); Holcombe v. Whitaker, 318 S.2d 289 (Ala. 1975); 
Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.Y. 675 (N.Y. 1933). 
Those cases cited which do involve awards for mental 
anguish appear to confuse or blur the distinction between a cause 
of action for fraud and a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., First National Bank 
of New Castle v. Acra, 462 N.E.2d 1345 (Ind. App. 1984) where the 
court specifically based its decision on the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress standard. Id. at 350. 
Similarly, See, Baker v. American States Insurance, 428 N.E.2d 
1342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) and McGregor v. Mommer, 714 P.2d 536 
(Mont. 1986). 
As noted above, there is no case in Utah indicating 
that Utah would split from the majority rule and permit recovery 
of emotional distress damages in a fraud action. This court has 
on several occasions expressed its concern with emotional damages 
claims and reluctance to expand and widen the basis of liability 
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for such claims. In the case of First Security Bank of Utah v. 
JBJ Feed Yards , 353 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), the court stated: 
Damages for mental anguish are an extreme 
remedy which should be dispensed with 
caution. 
In this case, plaintiff is attempting to convert a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress into a 
fraud claim. In fact, as originally filed, plaintiff's Complaint 
requested relief upon the theory of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. That cause of action was dismissed and 
plaintiff has not appealed. 
In evaluating the standards for an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim, this court has adopted 
the Restatement of Torts (Second), Section 46 in the case of 
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). That section 
provides: 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress, and if 
bodily harm to the other results from it, for 
such bodily harm. (Emphasis added.) 
The official comments to this section go in more depth 
in explaining the intent of this section. Comment D states: 
The cases thus far decided have found 
liability only where defendants' conduct has 
been extreme and outrageous. It has not been 
enough that the defendant has acted with an 
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intent which is tortious or even criminal, or 
that he has intended to inflict emotional 
distress, or even that his conduct has been 
characterized by "malice" or a degree of 
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff 
to punitive damages for another tort. 
Liability has been found only where the 
conduct has been so outrageous in character, 
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and be regarded 
as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community. 
Plaintiff's attempt to avoid the strict standards of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress law by pleading an 
emotional distress claim as a fraud claim is inappropriate. 
Plaintiff initially made the proper claim with regard to her 
emotional distress claims and the trial court dismissed it. This 
court should decline plaintiff's invitation to bypass the 
established law of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
POINT B-2 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OP PLAINTIFF'S 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND TREATMENT WAS COMPELLED BY THE LAW AND 
WAS NECESSARY TO A PROPER EVALUATION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM. 
At Point 6 of her brief, plaintiff claims that the 
evidence of her many psychological problems and treatment should 
have been excluded by the Court. It is not clear from the brief 
whether plaintiff is claiming that the evidence regarding her 
psychological history was irrelevant or if she is admitting that 
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the evidence is relevant and claiming that it was more 
prejudicial than probative. 
A. Relevance, 
A review of the facts of this case clearly shows that 
the evidence was relevant to the jury's consideration. 
Specifically, it was relevant at a minimum in the following 
considerations: 
1. An evaluation of how plaintiff's apparent emotional 
state in the court room resulted from other causes and not from 
causes related to the Inteltech investigation. 
2. How the Inteltech investigation would have affected 
a person of plaintiff's unusual mental state. 
3. How plaintiff's mental history affects her ability 
to recall and testify truthfully and accurately with regard to 
the events surrounding the investigation. 
4. The extent to which plaintiff felt sufficient 
emotional impact from the investigation to mention it (or not 
mention it) to her mental health counselors. 
5. How plaintiff's mental condition affected her 
ability to accurately describe her emotional reaction, if any. 
As noted in the Fact Statement in defendant's initial 
brief, plaintiff never related anything regarding the Inteltech 
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investigation to any of her various psychological counselors. 
This was true even though she was undergoing psychological 
treatment throughout the relevant time period and was a resident 
patient at a psychological hospital at the time of the trial. 
She never once indicated to any of those counselors and other 
professionals that the event involving Inteltech had in any way 
caused her emotional strain, disruption or other problems. 
Furthermore, her records demonstrated that her 
counselors believed that she was unable to accurately relate her 
psychological and emotional history and events in her life. 
Finally, the records demonstrated why plaintiff appeared and 
behaved as she did at trial. 
In the absence of the records and testimony regarding 
her history, the jury would have been unable to understand 
plaintiff's testimony in context. 
Plaintiff would like to pick and choose what evidence 
regarding her psychological well being goes before the jury. Her 
argument that she can simply explain what she wants considered 
and all other aspects have to be kept out of evidence has no 
support in the law. At such time as a plaintiff makes a claim 
for psychological injury and emotional upset, her privilege 
against the discovery of information regarding that history is 
waived. Utah Code Ann., Section 58-25A-8(2)(f). 
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Where the patient or client, by alleging 
mental or emotional damages in litigation, 
puts his mental state at issue. 
When she proceeds to make a claim at trial for mental 
injury, all information relevant to her mental state is relevant. 
Probative Value, 
Plaintiff's brief makes the totally unsubstantiated 
claim that her psychological history was used to somehow confuse 
the jury. She accuses the defendants of using an unfair tactic. 
Such an allegation is ridiculous. 
The fact of the matter is that defendant's counsel 
thought long and hard before submitting this evidence in court. 
The obvious impact of a great deal of the evidence was to 
engender great sympathy for the plaintiff who had been victimized 
by various men in her family for years. Defendant's counsel had 
substantial and real concerns that placing such information 
before the jury could arouse sympathy in the court and jury 
causing them to favor the plaintiff. 
Nevertheless, the evidence was critical in discrediting 
plaintiff's testimony. Plaintiff wished to simply testify to the 
effect that she had been caused great emotional upset by the 
Inteltech investigation and leave it at that. She did not wish 
the jury to know of the true cause of her emotional disturbance. 
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She further did not wish the jury to know of her inability to 
testify with accuracy regarding her emotional feelings and 
various events in her life. Finally, and understandably, she 
didn't wish the jury to know that the Inteltech investigation was 
such a de minimum event in her life that she had never had 
occasion to mention it to any of her many counselors and 
psychiatrists. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading of the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The instant case doesn't even approach this 
"substantial" standard. There is no evidence of any prejudice 
confusion or misleading whatsoever. It simply defies logic for 
plaintiff's new attorney to suggest that some confusion was 
caused by this evidence. Any prejudice aroused by this evidence 
was in plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff's suggestion now, that the 
admission of that evidence somehow biased the jury against her, 
is illogical and wrong. 
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POINT B-3 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DID NOT RECONVENE THE JURY FOR 
CONSIDERATION OF DAMAGE AMOUNTS. 
After the jury verdict was returned, plaintiff's former 
counsel asked for a conference at bar. At that time, he 
requested that the trial judge send the jury out for a specific 
determination of damages. Plaintiff made this request 
notwithstanding the fact that the jury had been instructed not to 
consider damages if they found no liability. Plaintiff had not 
objected to this instruction and only raised this unusual request 
after receiving an adverse verdict. The judge rejected that 
request. 
Subsequently, at the hearing on her motion for JNOV, 
plaintiff requested that the judge only rule with regard to 
liability and order a new trial as to damages. Judge Wilkinson 
rejected that approach. The judge specifically asked plaintiff's 
counsel for an explanation of why the damage issue should go the 
jury: 
The Court: Why does it have to go to the 
jury? 
Mr. Jensen: I don't know, I don't know, 
Judge. 
(Transcript of Hearing, p. 19.) 
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Although defendants strongly disagree with Judge 
Wilkinson's decision to grant a JNOV, Utah law clearly supports 
his determination that any JNOV order must be a complete order. 
It is not appropriate in a case such as this to split issues and 
grant a half of a JNOV. Highland v. St. Mark's, 427 P.2d 736 
(Utah 1967) and Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. of 
App. 1988). 
The Highland case involved a medical malpractice claim 
alleging personal injuries. The jury returned a verdict of no 
cause of action. The trial judge attempted to do exactly what is 
suggested here, that is, he found liability but ordered a new 
trial to be restricted to the issue of damages. The Utah Supreme 
Court reversed that decision and returned the matter for a new 
trial on all issues. The Court emphasized that in a personal 
injury action, the issues of liability and damage are so 
intertwined that it is not appropriate to split the issues. The 
court commented: 
There are undoubtedly some instances where 
limiting a trial to the issue of damages only 
may be justified, as our rules allow. But 
courts generally do not look with favor upon 
such a restriction. The reasons why this is 
so in personal injury actions are well 
exemplified in this case. The questions 
relating to plaintiff's injury, how it 
happened, who was at fault, and the pain and 
injury occasioned thereby, are so 
intermingled that if there is to be a new 
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trial, in fairness to both parties, it should 
be on all issues. 
427 P.2d at 738. 
In the instant case, the facts supporting whatever 
damages or emotional upset the plaintiff claims are inextricably 
interwoven with the facts of the Inteltech investigation itself. 
The liability issues and damage issues rest on the same facts. 
Under the rule of the Highland case and the Mikkelsen case, it 
would be inappropriate to grant half of a JNOV and then hold a 
new trial with regard to the damage issues only. 
If Judge Wilkinson was going to grant a JNOV and ignore 
the jury's determination, under the rules it is appropriate for 
him to grant a complete judgment. Plaintiff cannot pick and 
choose those aspects of his judgment with which she is pleased. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury in this case deliberated and reached a 
unanimous verdict adverse to plaintiff. There was certainly 
evidence to support its finding that no invasion of privacy had 
occurred and that plaintiff had failed to prove fraud. 
Plaintiff's evidence as to the severity of the claimed intrusion 
into her life and as to her damages resulting from the claimed 
fraud all rested almost entirely on her own testimony. The jury 
simply found her to be not a credible witness. 
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There was nothing in the conduct of the Inteltech 
investigation that the jury found to be highly offensive. 
The fact that Judge Wilkinson disagreed with the jury 
does not justify his entry of a JNOV. A JNOV may only be entered 
if there is a complete absence of evidence to support the 
verdict. In this case, the verdict was well supported. 
Accordingly, Judge Wilkinson's JNOV must be overturned. 
This case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of 
judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. 
DATED /*2fi day of 04£~>*_.. ^ , 1991. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
ROBERT^. SIRENS 
Attorneys for Oak Norton, Inteldex 
Corporation dba Inteltech 
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